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H

undreds of thousands of Americans each year sign pieces of
paper "voluntarily" admitting themselves into psychiatric
hospitals.' Many, perhaps most, do not understand the legal
significance of the piece of paper, which drastically curtails
individual freedom. In some states, signing the paper means that
the patient can be held against his will for up to five days before
the facility has to release him or attempt to justify continued
detention 2.
Although the effect on personal liberty is generally not as
severe, much the same thing routinely happens with respect to
I Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 169, 179 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent].
2 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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other health care decisions. Doctors often treat patients who
have dubious capacity and do not object to treatment without
assessing capacity or considering alternative decision making.3
Lack of capacity promises to be a growing issue as the
population ages because the risk of dementia increases
exponentially with age.4
Capacity is critical because the doctrine of informed consent
requires that the patient have capacity to consent
But this
requirement is overwhelmed by forces
pulling
in
the
opposite
•
6
direction. First, law presumes capacity. Second, the primary
ethical goal of beneficence, improving patient Well-being, guides
medical practice. If the patient agrees to do what the doctor
believes is in the patient's best interests, the doctor looks no
further and simply presumes capacity.
The practice of treating without meaningful consent violates
the fundamental principle of patient autonomy or selfdetermination. Assent without capacity is not an expression of
autonomy; it is at best an illusion of autonomy. The practical
problem with accepting incompetent consent is that it
systematically leads to treatment where patients, if they had
capacity, would refuse it. Self-determination is and should be
the dominant objective in medical decision making and it should
be implemented by minimizing instances in which treatment
deviates from what the patient, if competent, would want.
Some commentators believe that incompetent consent is not a
problem. "If a patient consents to treatment, his or her
competency is not important if a finding of incompetency would
likely lead to treatment."7
The words "likely," "if," and
"consents" should ring alarms. As for "likely," the issue of
competency is important if treatment sometimes, even if less
than half the time, would be refused by an alternative decisionmaking scheme. The second "if" raises the question of who
3 On alternative decision making, see, e.g., infra notes 27-31 and accompanying
text.
4 J.G. Wong et al., Capacity to Make Health Care Decisions: Its Importance in
ClinicalPractice,29 PSYCHOL. MED. 437, 438 (1999).
5 Wendy M. Margolis, Comment, The Doctor Knows Best?: Patient Capacity for
Health Care Decisionmaking,71 OR. L. REV. 909, 918-19 (1992).

6

See infra notes 20, 23 and accompanying text.
R. Saks & Dilip V. Jeste, Capacity to Consent to or Refuse Treatment

7 Elyn

andlor Research: Theoretical Considerations,24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411, 423 (2006).
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decides whether treatment is likely given an incompetency
finding. Accepting incompetent-patient assent at face value
cedes control over the treatment decision to the doctor.
Evidence shows that doctors are worse than relatives at
predicting a patient's treatment preferences. The better and
more direct way to find out whether an alternative decision
maker would consent to treatment is to test the patient's
capacity, then simply ask the alternative decision maker if
appropriate. Finally, and most fundamentally, a patient cannot
"consent" without capacity, and treatment without capable
consent is medical battery.8
This Article will examine three hypothetical situations
involving health care decision making. The issue in each will be
how to make a medical decision when the patient does not
refuse treatment but may lack decision-making capacity. The
Article will first discuss how treatment decisions are actually
being made, then examine how these decisions are supposed to
be made under current law. For concreteness, the focus will be
on Illinois law, but the implications will be general. Next, the
Article will propose and defend a new model of decision making.
The guiding principle is that treatment decisions should
correspond as closely as possible to patients' true preferences.
The specific issues addressed will be: when to test capacity,
how to test capacity, and what to do when capacity is lacking.
To preview the conclusions: (1) existing data and new theories
are marshaled in support of mandatory capacity assessment in
various circumstances; (2) standardized instruments rather than
physician discretion should be used to assess capacity; and (3)
when capacity is lacking, the patient does not resist treatment,
and there is no advance directive, a familial surrogate should
make the medical decision because family predicts patient
preferences better than doctors.
8 Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1993). It is therefore
misleading to speak about competency to refuse treatment. See Saks & Jeste, supra
note 7, at 423. It is treatment, not the lack of treatment, that must be justified.
As the reader will have noticed, "competence" is sometimes used in this Article
instead of "capacity." The terms are equivalent for purposes of this Article. Both
mean the ability to give informed consent to medical treatment. This Article will
generally use capacity rather than competence for several reasons: "incapacitated"
is less stigmatizing than "incompetent," capacity is more likely to be properly
construed as task-specific, and capacity has more clinical connotations, which are
this Article's focus.
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The final Part before the Conclusion will consider possible
extensions of the model to instances in which no surrogate is
available or the patient refuses treatment.
Hypotheticals:

(1) The doctor of an elderly married woman with delirium
concludes that the patient would benefit from a nonemergent
blood transfusion. The patient assents9 to the transfusion.
(2) A widow with dementia is having evening delusions. Her
clinic doctor would like to prescribe an antipsychotic
medication. The patient assents to treatment.
(3) An unmarried man with bipolar disorder presents to a
mental health care facility experiencing manic symptoms. The
patient is willing to sign a voluntary-admission form.
I
CURRENT PRACTICE

In all three hypotheticals, it is quite likely that each patient
would receive treatment with no further examination of patient
capacity and no exploration of alternative decision making.
"Questions concerning patient competence tend to be raised
only when patients decline
to follow physicians'
recommendations ... ,l' In one retrospective study of informed
consent practices, "nearly all" patients sampled in a hospital
setting studied had "questionable decision-making capacity," but
"only patients who refused treatment had their competence
challenged."'" In one epidemiologic study of older inpatients
who developed delirium, researchers found no documented

9 The word "assent" rather than "consent" is used throughout the hypotheticals
because the patient may lack capacity to give informed consent.
10 Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. III: Abilities of Patientsto Consentto Psychiatricand Medical Treatments, 19
LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 149,171 (1995).
11 Bennett S. Gurian et al., Informed Consent for Neuroleptics with Elderly
Patients in Two Settings, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 37, 42 (1990); see also
Michael G. Farnsworth, Competency Evaluations in a General Hospital, 31
PSYCHOSOMATICS 60, 61 (1990) ("[P]atients who refused medical treatment were
more commonly referred for evaluation of competence than were patients who
accepted treatment.").
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assessments of decision-making capacity.' 2 This despite a
"relatively high baseline rate of functional impairment (76%) ...
13
and notable cognitive impairment (mean MMSE of 20.1)."
In another study surveying specialists, 89% of respondent
psychiatrists, geriatric psychologists, and geriatricians reported
that the following misconception regarding capacity
determinations was either "common" or "very common" among
referring clinicians: "[a]s long as a patient agrees with the
practitioner's health care recommendations, the practitioner fails14
to consider that the patient may lack capacity for decisions.'
Among sixteen capacity pitfalls thought by respondents to be
most important to address through education, this was the one
that the highest percentage of respondents (52%) believed was
"very common."' 5
Treatment without a capacity evaluation is most likely in
Hypothetical Three, even though that is where the likelihood of
incapacity and burdens of treatment are arguably greatest. As
another commentator notes, "[b]ecause most mental health
professionals favor voluntary admission, 'in practice the question
of competence is usually ignored."" 6 As will be demonstrated

below, the
law in Illinois and other states exacerbates this
7
practice.

12 Katherine B. Auerswald et al., The Informed Consent Process in Older Patients
Who Developed Delirium: A Clinical Epidemiologic Study, 103 AM. J. MED. 410,

410 (1997).
13 Id. at 413. "MMSE" stands for mini-mental state examination, which is a
thirty-point cognitive function screening tool. A score of twenty is at the low end of
the mild-dementia range.
Wikipedia, Mini-Mental State Examination,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mini-mental stateexamination (last visited Dec. 20,
2008).
14 Linda Ganzini et al., Pitfalls in Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity, 44
PSYCHOSOMATICS 237, 239-40 tbl.1 (2003).
15

Id.

16 Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of Incompetent Persons
with a Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 168 (2005) (quoting THOMAS
G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND

THE LAW 48 (3d ed. 2000)).
17 Federal law, discussed below, discourages the practice, Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113 (1990), but it is widely ignored, e.g., Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060,
1062-63 (7th Cir. 1994).
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II
CURRENT LAW

A. Hypothetical One: DeliriousPatientand Blood Transfusion
Administering medical treatment without informed consent
from a patient with capacity (absent an emergency,' 8 which this
Article assumes) is medical battery.' 9 Thus, the doctor should
first determine whether the patient has the capacity to give
informed consent. Because the common law presumes that all
adults have capacity, 20 however, this may be an ethical rather
than legal obligation.2 1 Under the Illinois Health Care Surrogate
Act (the "Act"), "'[d]ecisional capacity' means the ability to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a
decision regarding medical treatment or forgoing life-sustaining
treatment and the ability to reach and communicate an informed
decision in the matter as determined by the attending
physician., 22 Everyone is presumed to have capacity for
purposes of the Act "in the absence of actual notice to the

18 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-111 (2008) (allowing "essential medical
procedures" to be performed without consent when a "medical or dental emergency
exists").
19See supra note 8.
20 E.g., Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. App. 1994), and authorities
cited therein; see also Lotman v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 868, 873 (3d
Cir. 1973) (presumption of sanity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d
(1965) (burden on plaintiff to show absence of consent). But cf Estate of Allen v.
Rockford Health Sys., Inc., 848 N.E.2d 202, 214 (I11.2006) (stating in dicta that
presumption of capacity arising from statute does not -apply to a common law claim
for medical battery).
21 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 8.08,

http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/Code-of MedEtif/opinion/
opinion808.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
22 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10 (2008). This standard is generally consistent with
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the leading summary. of legal
competence in the medical literature. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §
1(3) (1994) ("'Capacity' means an individual's ability to understand the significant
benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to make and
communicate a health-care decision."); Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso,
Assessing Patients' Capacitiesto Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635,
1635-36 (1988) (listing abilities to communicate choices, understand relevant
information, appreciate the situation and consequences, and manipulate
information rationally). The distinction between understanding and appreciation is
not self-evident. Appreciation can be thought of as applied understanding:
acknowledging the personal impact of relevant information. See id. at 1636.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

contrary.,

23

[Vol. 87, 353

Thus, that the doctor reasonably should know a

patient lacks capacity does not override the presumption.24 The
attending physician must find incapacity "to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty., 25 In the hypothetical, this means that the
doctor will accept the patient's assent to the transfusion unless
the doctor is reasonably certain that the patient lacks capacity.
A finding of incapacity must be recorded in the patient's medical
record.26
If the doctor finds incapacity, she must next make reasonable
inquiry into the existence of an applicable advance directive, like
27
a living will or health-care power of attorney. In the absence of
281
such a document, which this Article assumes, the doctor must
next inquire as to the availability of individuals in the top four
levels of a surrogate decision-maker hierarchy: (1) the patient's
guardian of the person, (2) the patient's spouse, (3) any adult
daughter or son of the patient, and (4) either parent of the
29
patient.
Assume in the hypothetical that there is no court-appointed
guardian and the patient's husband is easily accessible. If the
patient lacks capacity, the doctor can generally rely on a
23 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008).
24 Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 892 (I11.
1996).
25 755 I11.
Comp. Stat. 40/20(c) (2008). One commentator has argued that a
surrogate should be consulted whenever the patient "may lack capacity." Rebecca
J. O'Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisionsfor Adults in Illinois-Answers to the
Legal Questions That Health Care Providers Face on a Daily Basis, 29 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 411, 423 (1998). But, as the Act states, the doctor must be reasonably certain
that the patient actually lacks capacity. Otherwise, consulting a surrogate may
violate patient privacy interests under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a). The same commentator would
limit surrogacy to "necessary" treatments, O'Neill, supra at 423, but that limitation
is ambiguous and unduly narrow.
26 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008).

27 Id. § 40/25(a).
28 This assumption is reasonable: "Population-based estimates of completed
advance directives range from 5% to 15%." Sharda D. Ramsaroop et al.,
Completing an Advance Directive in the Primary Care Setting: What Do We Need for
Success?, 55 J.AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 277, 277 (2007); see also Jeffrey Swanson et
al., PsychiatricAdvance Directives Among Public Mental Health Consumers in Five
U.S. Cities: Prevalence, Demand, and Correlates, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
43, 54 (2006) (4%-13% of mental-health consumers had completed psychiatric
advance directives).
29 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/25(a)(1)-(4) (2008). The rules, including surrogate
priority, are the same under section 5 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.
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treatment.decision made by the husbandunless that decision is
"clearly contrary to [the] Act., 3" The Act instructs that
[a] surrogate decision maker shall make decisions for the
patient conforming as closely as possible to what the patient
would have done or intended under the circumstances .... If
the adult patient's wishes are unknown ... , the decision shall

be made on the basis of the patient's best interests as
determined by the surrogate decision maker.3'
This two-prong test-substituted judgment first, then best
interests of the patient-corresponds to the two values at stake
in medical decision making: self-determination, generally first,
and the patient's well-being, generally second.3 z The doctor also
cannot rely on the surrogate if the patient "objects" to the
surrogate or any decision made by the surrogate.33
Suppose the husband's lone objection is that his wife is afraid
of needles. The doctor should pause twice before accepting this
decision because: (1) the doctor cannot rely on the husband's
decision if it is clear that the patient would set aside her fear of
needles, i.e., the decision would be "clearly contrary" to the
Act's substituted-judgment rule; and, more fundamentally, (2)
the patient's assent arguably constitutes an objection to her
husband's decision, Which would negate operation of the Act.
Either way, the doctor is left with no one having authority to
consent to treatment and, without a trip to court, can transfuse
only at peril of an action for medical battery. It is important to
emphasize that the second reason for pause-the patient's
objection-applies no matter how good the justification for the
surrogate's decision. Suppose instead of a needle phobia, the
30 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/30(a) (2008).
At least one commentator has
suggested that this transfer of decision-making authority to a surrogate violates due
process. O'Neill, supra note 25, at 428. I am aware of no successful challenge to a
surrogacy act on these grounds. To the contrary, the Indiana Supreme Court
squarely rejected such a challenge. See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 n.8 (Ind.
1991) (surrogacy statute did not convert family decision into state action for due
process purposes).
31 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(b-5)(1) (2008). This mandate is in accord with
section 5 of the Unified Health-Care Decisions Act.
32 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978);
McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Com. P. 1978); cf. Allen Buchanan &
Dan W. Brock, Decidingfor Others, 64 MILBANK Q. 17 (Supp. 2 1986).
33 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008). This provision is consistent with the law
in other states. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4689 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
201D, § 6 (2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2983(5) (McKinney 2008).
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husband had said that his wife was a devout Jehovah's Witness
and could therefore not accept a blood transfusion. Even
though the patient assented while in an incapacitated state, her
assent would counteract her husband's conscious decision.
Of course, if the husband consents to the blood transfusion,
then the doctor is on sturdier footing. Unless the doctor knows
the patient would refuse the transfusion, such that treatment
would be clearly contrary to the statutory substituted-judgment
rule of decision making, or the doctor has other reason to think
the husband is thwarting the Act, she can safely rely on the
husband's consent.
B. Hypothetical Two: Delusional Patieqtand Antipsychotic
Medication
As above, the doctor should assess capacity to satisfy her
ethical duty with respect to informed consent and to avoid a
claim of medical battery. In this second scenario, however, a
third source of this duty arises. The Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (the "Code") mandates
disclosure of risks and benefits of psychotropic medication or
electro-convulsive therapy ("ECT") and compels the doctor to
"determine and state in writing whether the recipient has the
capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment. 3 4
Although this language appears in section 5/2-102, a section of
the Code that also discusses duties of "the facility," that section
is not limited to the inpatient setting. The following two sections
expressly limit their scope to recipients "who reside[] in a mental
health . . . facility,, 35 while section 5/2-102 includes no such
limitation and thus applies to both inpatient and outpatient
36
settings.
If the doctor finds capacity, the doctor will again accept the
patient's consent and order treatment. If the doctor finds a lack
of capacity, her road diverges sharply from the blood-transfusion
case. A surrogate decision maker other than a court-appointed
34 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a-5) (2008). I am aware of no comparable
provision in California, Massachusetts, or New York.

35 Id. §§ 5/2-103, 5/2-104.

36 To the contrary, section 5/2-102 uses the unmodified word "recipient," which is
defined to include, inter alia, any person who has received or is receiving
"treatment." Id. § 5/1-123. "Treatment," in turn, expressly covers "outpatient
services." Id. § 5/1-128.
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guardian may not consent to the administration of psychotropic
medication or ECT.3 v Assume that the patient's only adult child
is available and consents to administration of psychotropic
medication. That consent is meaningless under the clear terms
of the Act and Code. The nonguardian surrogate's power to
refuse treatment, no matter how good the reason (e.g., a severe
adverse reaction in the past to the particular medication
proposed), is also questionable. The Code's most specific
statutory provision on this point limits the right to refuse
medication to "[t]he recipient and the recipient's guardian or
substitute decision maker., 38 "Substitute decision maker" is
defined to include only individuals appointed in advance
directives, not by operation of the Act.
The doctor needs authority from somewhere other than the
There are two options:
patient or patient's surrogate.
guardianship or a mental-health treatment petition under the
Code. Guardianship is rarely used in the mental-health context,
both because a guardian has no authority to override a patient's
treatment refusal 40 and because it is a time-consuming and

relatively permanent process. Delay is critical since mentalhealth treatment can often restore capacity. Any person over
eighteen years of age can file a mental-health treatment
41
petition. Subject to certain continuances, the court must hold a
hearing within seven days of the filing of the petition. 2 To
authorize treatment, the court must find seven factors by clear
and convincing evidence, including that the recipient lacks
capacity and that the benefits of treatment outweigh the harm.43

37 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/60(a)-(b) (2008); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-121.5
(2008). At least nine other states and the District of Columbia exclude some forms

of mental-health care from their surrogate decision-making statutes.

ALASKA

STAT. § 13.52.030(a) (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(E) (West

2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 (West 2008); D.C. CODE § 21-2211 (West
2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(1) (West 2007); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 5-605(d)(2) (West 2008);

MISS.

CODE ANN. § 41-41-227(5) (West 2007); N.M.

STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13 (West 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13(4) (West 2008);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(C) (West 2008).
38 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107(a) (2008).
39 Id. § 5/1-110.5.
40 Id. § 5/2-107.1(b).
41 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1).
42 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(2).
43 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4).
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C. Hypothetical Three: Manic Patientand Hospitalization

Again, the doctor should first assess capacity. There is no
specific

statutory

requirement

to

do

so,44

unlike

with

psychotropic medication and ECT. There is, however, United
States Supreme Court case law strongly suggesting that due
process requires some assessment of capacity at least in state-run
facilities. In Zinermon v. Burch, a patient complained that he
lacked capacity to give informed consent, and thus his voluntary
admission to a psychiatric facility deprived him of liberty without
due process of law.45 The Court decided the case on a technical
ground, expressly indicating that it was not deciding what the
Constitution required in such cases. 46 The Court did, however,

state that the patient's five-month confinement, with no hearing
or other procedure to determine the validity of consent or
whether the patient met the standard for involuntary placement,
"clearly infringes on [the] S liberty interest" in avoiding
47
confinement in a mental hospital.
If the doctor finds capacity, the patient can consent to
voluntary admission. If the doctor finds incapacity, reliance on
surrogate consent is expressly prohibited. 4" A surrogate may,
however, petition for involuntary admission.4 9 But the grounds
for voluntary and involuntary admission are different.
Involuntary admission requires that the patient be "in such a
condition that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the
protection of such person or others from physical harm., 50 In
contrast, voluntary admission is allowed on the broader and
more discretionary ground that "the facility director deems [the
patient] clinically suitable for admission as a voluntary
recipient." 51 Some incapacitated patients who could benefit
44 In this respect, Illinois is like most states. See Winick, Competency to.Consent,
supra note 1, at 178 n.59.
45 494 U.S. 113, 114-15 (1990).
46
47

Id. at 117.
Id. at 131.

48 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601.2 (2008). In this, Illinois is like many other
states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(1) (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41227(5) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13(E) (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §
23-12-13(4) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(C) (2001).
49 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601.2 (2008).
50 Id. § 5/3-601(a).
51

Id. § 5/3-400.
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from hospitalization (and would consent to it if competent) may
not be immediately dangerous and therefore could not be
admitted either voluntarily or involuntarily. Plainly, there is
potential for some individuals to fall between the cracks.52
If the incapacitated bipolar man in the hypothetical is
dangerous to himself or others, any person eighteen years or
older, including the facility director, may file a petition for
The petition generally must be
involuntary admission.5 3
accompanied by a certificate executed by a mental-health
professional relaying clinical observations based on an
examination made not more than seventy-two hours prior to
admission. 54 Within twenty-four hours of admission, the facility
director must file the petition and certificate in court, and a
If the
hearing must be scheduled within five days.55
incapacitated man presents no immediate danger to himself or
others, he cannot be admitted, despite his willingness to sign a
consent form, his surrogate's concurrence, and his need for
admission on any ground other than dangerousness.
D. Sources of the Disconnect Between Law and Practice
Doctors fail to test the capacity of assenting patients for
several reasons. Probably the strongest force at work is doctors'
overriding goal of beneficence.56 The doctor has already
determined that treatment is in the patient's best interests. If the
patient does not resist, the overwhelming pull is toward
treatment. The "asymmetric sliding scale," discussed infra Part
III.B.1, also tilts against testing, because it sets the capacity bar
low where the patient makes the "right" decision.
The next contributing cause is the presumption of capacity.
Few doctors may be aware that a legal presumption of capacity
exists, but they no doubt operate consistent with the
presumption, and their lawyers would require capacity forms
52

See Francine Cournos et al., Report of the Task Force on Consent to Voluntary

Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 293, 293 (1993) ("[N]ot

every patient who could benefit significantly from voluntary hospitalization will
meet the more restrictive requirements for involuntary hospitalization .... "). This
gap exists in many states other than Illinois.
53 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601(a).
Id. § 5/3-602.
55 Id. § 5/3-611.
54

56 See Buchanan & Brock, supra note 32, at 28.
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along with informed consent forms if the presumption did not
exist. A related factor is the absence of any enforced legal
requirement to test capacity. To be sure, Illinois technically
requires capacity testing before administration of psychotropic
medications or ECT, but there is no enforcement provision or
penalty. 7
With voluntary hospitalization, apart from
Zinermon's dicta, there is no requirement even on paper. A
final cause of the failure to test capacity is the high cost of an
incapacity finding. This applies most strongly in the mentalhealth context, where a lack of capacity always requires a trip to
court, but it also applies whenever58 patient and surrogate
disagree in non-mental-health settings.
III
NEW MODEL

This Part outlines and defends an alternative model of health
care decision making for the situation in which a patient with
dubious capacity assents to treatment. Specifically, the model
addresses when to test capacity, how to test capacity, and what
to do when capacity is lacking. Because the first question (when
to test) turns on the accuracy of the test (how to test) and the
accuracy of alternative decision making (what to do if incapacity
is found), the three issues are discussed in reverse order.
A. What to Do When the PatientLacks Capacity
When a patient lacks capacity, someone else must make the
decision for him. 59 The candidates are: (1) the doctor, (2) the
statutory surrogate, (3) an appointed proxy, (4) a guardian, or
57 On the other hand, tort liability is possible. See Threlkeld v. White Castle Sys.,
205 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937 (N.D. I11.2002).
58 Prohibiting surrogate decision making appears to cause assessors to lower the
capacity threshold where testing is required. Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Proxy and
Surrogate Consent in Geriatric Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and
Recommendations, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 797, 803 (2004). Where testing is
optional, it seems likely to suppose that physicians would test capacity less if
surrogate decision making were unavailable.
59 This assumes reasonable efforts to improve capacity have failed. Research has
demonstrated the effectiveness of such efforts. Scott Y.H. Kim et al., CurrentState
of Research on Decision-Making Competence of Cognitively Impaired Elderly
Persons, 10 Avi. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 151, 162 (2002); David J. Moser et al.,
Using a Brief Intervention to Improve Decisional Capacity in Schizophrenia
Research, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 116, 116 (2005).
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(5) a court. To best promote self-determination, a proxy
designated in an advance directive or health-care power of
attorney should be given priority. 60 If a guardian with power
over the patient's health care has already been appointed, the
formal process through which such appointment occurred would
seem to put the guardian next in line. Going to court in every
case either to appoint a guardian or to decide a treatment
question would squander precious treatment time and
overburden the courts. 6' Lack of a proxy or guardian leaves the
doctor and statutory surrogate as the viable first-line decision
makers.
In current practice, especially in mental health,
treatment decisions are often left entirely to the doctor's
discretion if the patient assents. Surrogates would make better
decisions.
A recent review of sixteen studies found that surrogates
predicted patients' treatment preferences with 68% accuracy.62
The reviewers concluded that the "data undermine the claim
that reliance on surrogates is justified by their ability to predict
incapacitated patients' treatment preferences., 63 But surrogates
did significantly better than chance: the lower bound of the 95%
confidence interval (CI) on the 68% figure was 63% (the upper
bound was 72%), well above the 50% one might expect from a
coin toss.64
Furthermore, in scenarios more closely
approximating an actual treatment decision, the 68% figure rose
significantly: surrogates correctly predicted patients' preferences
in 79% of scenarios involving the patient's current health (95%
CI, 74%-83%).65
On the other hand, surrogates were
significantly less accurate in scenarios involving dementia (58%;
60 This is already the rule in Illinois at least. In re Schmidt, 699 N.E.2d 1123, 1130
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
61 1

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE

STUDY

OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN

MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 55, 185 (1982)
[hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].

62 David I. Shalowitz et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers: A
Systematic Review, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 493,496 (2006).
63 Id. at 493, 496.

64 Id. at 495. Confidence intervals are used to describe the reliability of an
estimate. A 95% confidence interval means that we can be 95% certain that the
actual surrogate accuracy level was between 63% and 72%.

surrogate accuracy was as low as 50% is vanishingly small.
65 Id.

The chance that
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mental-health

condition

summarized in this review. 66 Finally, and most important for

present purposes, "[f]our additional studies confirmed that
surrogates predict patients' preferences more accurately than do
physicians.,

67

Those four studies covered fifteen hypothetical

treatment scenarios; surrogates were more accurate than doctors
in fourteen out of fifteen.68

One of those four studies, like the second hypothetical in this
Article, involved psychotropic medication.

69

Patients' closest

relatives correctly predicted whether the patient would take a
sleeping pill with 61% accuracy (n=36); physicians made the
same decision as the patient in 43% of cases (n=53). 70 Despite
the small sample sizes, this difference approached marginal
statistical significance (p=0.10). In sum, surrogates are better
than chance and better than doctors at predicting patient
preferences.7 '
It would be a mistake, however, to put too much faith in the

surrogate accuracy numbers found in the sixteen-study review
for two reasons. First, more than 90% of the 151 hypothetical
scenarios involved interventions necessary to save or sustain the
patient's life. 72 Most health-care decisions are not potentially

fatal, so research on more representative scenarios is needed.
66 Id. One might wonder how we can know the preferences of demented
patients. The finding reported in Shalowitz's text did not need to address that issue
because, although the scenarios involved dementia, the patients surveyed were not
actually demented.
67 Id. at 496.
68 Joseph G. Ouslander et al., Health Care Decisions Among Elderly Long-Term

Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED.

1367 (1989); Karem Principe-Rodriguez et al., Substituted Judgement: Should LifeSupport Decisions Be Made by a Surrogate?, 18 PUERTO Rico HEALTH SCI. J.405

(1999); Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy
Predictions?, 115 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 92 (1991); Richard F. Uhlmann et

al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation
Preferences,43 J. GERONTOLOGY M115 (1988).
69 Ouslander et al., supra note 68, at 1367.
70 Id. at 1369 tbl.1, 1370 tbl.2.
71 The review also provides some reason to think that statutorily designated
surrogates may do as well as court-appointed guardians. Patient-designated
surrogates predicted patients' preferences no better than legally assigned
surrogates. Shalowitz et al., supra note 62, at 496. If the patient himself cannot
select someone who will do better than the default statutory surrogate, then how
can we expect a court to?
72 Id. at 494.
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Second, and related, it is likely that investigators in the
underlying studies designed their hypotheticals to present
difficult treatment decisions. They would do so to avoid ceiling
effects. If 99% of patients would choose a particular treatment
alternative, one would expect the surrogates to recognize this
and to have a very low error rate. One study supports this claim:
84% of patients chose vaccination in one of four clinical
vignettes; surrogate accuracy was much higher in this vignette
(78%) than in the other three (64% mean), which presented
closer calls.73
There are reasons to question whether a patient's answer to a
hypothetical question is an accurate gauge of the patient's
preference should the situation actually arise. Preferences
change over time. In one study, about one-quarter of AIDS
patients presented with hypotheticals regarding life-extending"
treatment changed their preferences after four months.7 4 A
meta-analysis concluded that "over periods as short as two years,
almost one-third of preferences for life-sustaining medical
treatment changed. 7' 5 To the extent patient preferences are a
moving target, this presumably reduces surrogate accuracy
below what a snapshot in time would suggest.
It is important to note that there is a disconnect between the
surrogate accuracy studies and what surrogates are actually
asked to do. Illinois is not alone in its two-tier standard for
surrogate decision making: substituted judgment first and best
76
interests second. There is no gold standard for best interests,
so surrogate performance on this measure is impossible to test.
Instead, surrogates in accuracy studies are told to predict patient
preferences even if that means guessing. Presumably, surrogate
accuracy in the studies would increase if the surrogates'
predictions were limited to instances in which they believed they
knew how the patient would decide the question.

73 Ouslander et al., supra note 68, at 1369 tbl.1, 1370 tbl.2.
74 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 220 (2005) (citing Joel S. Weissman et al., The Stability

of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Care Among Persons with AIDS in the Boston
Health Study, 19 MED. DECISION MAKING 16, 20 (1999)).
75 Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30, 34.
76 UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e) (1994).
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That would, of course, leave decisions in which there is no
indication as to what the patient would want, which would make
substituted judgment impossible to apply. Why prefer family
members to make decisions here? The best-interests standard in
this context is subjective, not objective. In weighing relevant
benefits and burdens, surrogates in Illinois are instructed to
"take into account any other information, including the views of
family and friends, that the surrogate decision maker believes
the patient would have considered if able to act for herself or
himself.",77 Family members generally know the patient best;
they are therefore best positioned to know what factors the
patient would have considered, even if they do not know what
decision the patient would have made. 8
Patients want their family members to make health-care
decisions when there is no guidance on the patient's treatment
preference. In one study of research choices among older
individuals, "[a]lthough a clear majority (80.9%) preferred to
give advance instructions rather than have their family members
decide (12.6%), 87.8% also responded that their family members
may consent for them if no advance directive exists., 79 A
commentator summarized similar findings from other studies:
"[A]n overwhelming majority (approximately ninety percent) of
citizens . . . prefer that family members serve as health care

77 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.

40/20(b-5)(1) (2008).

78 Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who from What, and Why, and How?: A
Proposalfor an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER
L.J. 53, 90-91 (2004).

Closeness of relationship might be a better selection criterion than family ties, but
closeness of relationship is hard to measure. "[R]elational proximity is more
difficult for physicians and judges to confirm than familial proximity, thus the latter
is taken as a surrogate for the former. As a matter of policy this still seems to be the
most efficient course."
Jonathan D. Moreno, Who's to Choose? Surrogate
Decisionmaking in New York State, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 5,
7.
79 Kim et al., supra note 58, at 801. There is some indication that psychiatric
patients may have different preferences. See Debra S. Srebnik et al., The Content
and Clinical Utility of PsychiatricAdvance Directives, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES

592, 596 (2005) ("Just under half of the sample (46 percent) [of individuals with
severe and persistent mental illnesses in Washington state in 2001-2003] appointed
a surrogate decision maker. Most often friends were listed, followed by parents,
siblings, spouses, and children."). Further research on surrogate preferences is
needed.
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proxies .... " 8 0 There are other reasons to favor decision making
by family members: "[Flamily members will be most affected by
decisions, the patient excepted;... justice requires consideration
of the effects on family; and ... the family is a moral unit with
responsibility for its members." '
Surrogate decision making may also lead to more accurate
capacity testing. In one large study, sites where surrogate
decision making was prohibited reported much lower rates of
82
incapacity than sites allowing surrogate decision making.
Given that the study involved sufferers of Alzheimer's disease
with low MMSE scores, the very low levels of incapacity at the
no-surrogacy sites are suspicious. 83 This suggests that there is a
powerful disincentive to finding incapacity if there is no
surrogate decision-making structure in place.
Introducing a surrogate may advance patient well-being as
well as autonomy.
Research shows that patients without
decision-making capacity are less likely to receive treatment
consistent with the standard of care than patients with decisionmaking capacity."4 Given how common it is to treat assenting
incompetent patients without consulting surrogates, this finding
suggests that the involvement of a second competent decision
maker in addition to the doctor can improve the quality of
medical care. It is not surprising that collaborative decision
making should achieve better outcomes.
To be sure, there may be problems with relying on family
members, especially because "[t]here is a high prevalence of
elder abuse and exploitation by strangers, friends, and family

80 Alison Patrucco Barnes, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Beyond
Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System
of PrincipledDecision-Makingin Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633,686 (1992).
81 Jeffrey T. Berger, Patients' Interests in Their Family Members' Well-Being: An
Overlooked, Fundamental Consideration Within Substituted Judgments, 16 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 3, 4 (2005) (citing Dan W. Brock, What Is the Moral Authority of
Family Members to Act As Surrogates for Incompetent Patients?, 74 MILBANK Q.
599, 599-618 (1996)).
82

Kim et al., supra note 58, at 803.

83

See id. (MMSE scores ranged from thirteen to twenty-six, inclusive; incapacity

levels ranged from 0% to 15%).
84 Steven K. Hoge & Thomas C. Feucht-Haviar, Long-Term, Assenting
Psychiatric Patients: Decisional Capacity and the Quality of Care, 23 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 343,349 (1995).
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members."8' 5 In fact, "[d]isturbed patients not infrequently come
from disturbed families in which no available family member
possesses sufficient capacity to grasp the complexities of major
decisions. 8 6 Family dysfunction and conflicts of interest would
seem especially likely among the mentally ill. However,
[w]hile it may be argued that permitting family members or
close friends to make medical decisions on behalf of another
without judicial approval has the potential for abuse, "the
evidence for such abuse is all but nonexistent, and the health

care system would slip into paralysis if it had to delay
treatment of the large percentage of severely ill patients87who
are incompetent until a court hearing could be obtained.
The statutory surrogate to a patient lacking capacity is first a
patient-appointed proxy, then court-appointed guardian,
followed by family members in descending closeness of
relation,88 then close friends. When the patient lacks capacity to
give informed consent, the statutory surrogate should make
medical-treatment decisions, including decisions regarding
psychotropic medication and voluntary hospitalization.89 This
would also include the power to overrule the incapacitated
patient's assent to treatment.90

Because of the possibility of abuse, especially of mentally ill
patients, three additional protections are needed. First, a patient
who continues to assent to treatment after being informed of his
surrogate's treatment refusal should have the right to insist on a
second opinion regarding capacity. That opinion should be
85 Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity
in Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62B J.
GERONTOLOGY P3, P4 (2007) (citation omitted).
86 PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 205 (4th ed. 2007).
87 Halverson, supranote 16, at 167 (quoting GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM,.supra note

16, at 226). On the other hand, evidence that there is not familial abuse is also
lacking. More research is needed.
88 Although the exact priority list is outside the scope of this Article, a patient's

spouse would seem to belong on top of the familial hierarchy and should include a
same-sex partner. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(B)(2) (West 2008).
89 I am certainly not the first to make this proposal. E.g., Halverson, supra note
16; Michael Irwin et al., Psychotic Patients' Understandingof Informed Consent, 142
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1351, 1354 (1985). It is already the law in many states.
90 This would require a change in Illinois law, see supra text accompanying and
following note 33, as well as the laws of several other states. E.g., CAL. PROB.

CODE § 4689 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 6 (2008); N.Y.-PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2983(5) (McKinney 2008).
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rendered, where possible, by a health-care professional not
involved in, or subordinate to anyone who is involved in, the
patient's treatment. Even with relatively low capacity-test
accuracy, repeat testing can substantially improve confidence in
an incapacity finding. 9' Second, if the doctor believes that the
surrogate has clearly failed to respect the patient's expressed
wishes or, where the patient's wishes are unknown, to advance
the patient's best interests, then the doctor ought to be able to
petition the court for a treatment decision or appointment of a
guardian.
The third protection applies to voluntary admission for
psychiatric care. In Illinois, a patient who is voluntarily admitted
must be discharged within five days of giving written notice of
his desire to be discharged unless within that period an
involuntary petition is filed.92 The petition must be accompanied
by two certificates from a physician, qualified examiner, or
clinical psychologist stating that the patient is subject to
involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization.93
Hearing on that petition must take place within five days of the
filing of the petition.94 Thus, a voluntarily admitted patient can
go ten days before getting a hearing on the appropriateness of
hospitalization. The two-certificate requirement renders the
second five days somewhat less objectionable, but the initial fiveday period is troubling.
If a patient had capacity and understood the five-day holding
period when he executed the voluntary admission form, then
there would be less need to protect his change of mind. Under
my proposal, however, an incapacitated patient could be
admitted on a "voluntary" basis through the consent of a
surrogate. Such a patient almost certainly had no understanding
of the five-day period. Should the patient regain capacity, five
days is much too long to wait for release. A patient admitted by
a surrogate should have the right to a second opinion within
twenty-four hours as to capacity and the appropriateness of
hospitalization. The second opinion should come from a healthcare professional not involved in, or under the supervision of
91 See infra note 187.
92 405 ILL. COMP. STAT.

93 Id.; id. § 5/3-602.
94 Id. § 5/3-403.

5/3-403 (2008).
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anyone who is involved in, the patient's treatment. If this
professional finds capacity or release otherwise appropriate, the
facility should be required immediately either to release the
patient or to start involuntary admission proceedings.
B. How to Assess Capacity

Part III.A argued that familial surrogates should generally
make treatment decisions for patients who lack capacity. This
subsection examines the question of how one ought to assess
capacity. The appropriateness of a moving threshold of capacity,
or "sliding scale," is discussed first, followed by an argument that
capacity testing should be based on standardized instruments,
not discretionary judgment.
1. Sliding Scale

It is generally accepted that more exacting capacity scrutiny is
merited for certain decisions. There are at least three variations
on this theme: (1) a higher threshold for capacity is needed when
a patient refuses treatment than when a patient accepts
treatment because treatment is the benefit-cost justified choice; 95
(2) capacity testing is appropriate when a patient refuses
treatment, but not necessary when the patient accepts treatment,
because base rate incapacity is higher among treatment
refusers; 96 and (3) a higher threshold for capacity is called for
when the treatment decision presented is complicated or highstakes than when the decision is simple and low-stakes.97 Note

that the first and second variations are asymmetric between
refusal and acceptance, whereas the third version sets the
capacity threshold based on the choice presented, not the
decision made. For reasons that will become clear, this Article
95 Cathy A. Klein, Decision-Making Capacity and Informed Consent, 30 NURSE

PRAC. 12 (2005) ("A patient may have the capacity to consent to an intervention,
but may lack the capacity to refuse it."); APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 86, at
184. If the cost-benefit ratio is unfavorable, there is a high capacity threshold for
acceptance and low threshold for refusal. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 tbl.1 (1977).
96 Klein, supra note 95, at 12 ("If a patient makes a decision that the [nurse

practitioner] considers unreasonable, further investigation into the patient's
capacity is necessary.").
97 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 61, at 55, 60 (decision-making
capacity does not depend "on the decision reached," but greater capacity may be
required where "the consequences for well-being are substantial").

20081

Illusory Consent

will refer to these three variations, respectively, as the
asymmetric sliding scale, the sliding screen, and the symmetric
sliding scale.
The rationale usually provided for the asymmetric sliding
scale is it "takes into account the greater harm that may follow
from the failure to accept necessary medical care. ' '98 But greater
than what? Greater than the harm that may follow from
refusing optional rather than necessary medical care? No;
although this would justify the symmetric sliding scale, it does
not justify the asymmetric version. The comparison must instead
be between treatment and nontreatment-specifically, that is,
treatment over objection versus respecting the objection. If the
patient has capacity, the harm of treatment over objection is an
infringement on patient autonomy. The harm of failing to treat
an objecting patient is whatever health consequences follow.
Implicit in the asymmetric sliding scale is a judgment that patient
Well-being, as determined by the treating physician, sometimes
outweighs patient autonomy.
This same trade-off is at issue when the patient accepts
treatment. The doctor can either accept assent at face value or
examine the patient's capacity, thereby risking treatment refusal
by the surrogate (or court). If treatment is strongly justified by
cost-benefit analysis, the asymmetric sliding scale will put the
capacity bar so low that detailed capacity-assessment is
unnecessary. The patient who expresses the "right" choice will
almost always be deemed to have capacity. Proposed guidelines
for voluntary admission are illustrative. After the Supreme
Court's decision in Zinermon, there was real concern that the
practice of voluntary admission might be in trouble. One
response was to lower the capacity threshold for voluntary
choices"
and
admission
to
require
"communicating
"understanding relevant information." 99
The relevant
information included: (1) that the patient was being admitted to
a psychiatric hospital for treatment, and (2) that release may not
be automatic.1i° With this limited amount of information, almost
no sane person would agree to admission. The patient would

98 Cournos et al., supra note 52, at 301.
99 Id. at

300.
100 Id. at 304.
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insist at a minimum on knowing the terms and conditions
governing release.
As California has already done,'0 ' all states should outlaw the
asymmetric sliding scale. Doctors should not have the right to
trade off autonomy and well-being in setting the capacity
threshold. Whether a patient has capacity should not depend on
the choice made, but rather on the patient's ability to make the
choice. Competent patients have an unqualified right to make
decisions that their doctors think unwise.' ° The asymmetric
sliding scale "conflates the determination of capacity and
justified paternalistic interventions, or the determination of

capacity and the normative evaluation of outcome.', 03

A

defense of the asymmetric sliding scale, which on its surface

appears more compelling, is a desire to avoid erroneous failures
to treat."

But this defense ultimately depends on weighing

failures to treat more heavily than failures to respect
autonomy. 10 5 If errors are particularly costly for certain
treatment decisions, a symmetric solution is to test capacity more
than once rather
than placing a thumb on the scale to favor
16

treatment.

More exacting capacity scrutiny along these lines is parallel to
the second variation, the sliding screen. Although screening for

treatment refusers is generally justified as balancing autonomy
and beneficence, the discussion below of whom to test for

capacity demonstrates that a symmetric desire to minimize
101See CAL. PROB. CODE § 813(b) (2002) ("A person who has the capacity to
give informed consent to a proposed medical treatment also has the capacity to
refuse consent to that treatment.").
102 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232,1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
103 M. Parker, Competence by Consequence: Ambiguity and Incoherence in the
Law, 25 MED. L. 1, 8 (2006) (footnotes omitted). For additional arguments against
the sliding scale and a proposed three-tiered alternative, see Saks & Jeste, supra
note 7, at 422-23.
104 Alec Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to
Treatment, 97 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 415, 417 (2004).
105 See Parker, supra note 103, at 8 ("[I]f we raise the level of competence in
order to avoid mistakes, we simultaneously increase the risk of overriding
competent voluntary choices.").
106 See Gita S. Cale, Risk-Related Standards of Competence: Continuing the
Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 131, 148 (1999)
("While the risks related to a decision might be grounds for taking more care in
assessing a person's competence, they should not provide grounds for increasing the
standards by which a person's competence is assessed.").
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treatment errors can justify asymmetric screening if the data
show a substantial difference in base rate incapacity between
refusers and acceptors.' °7 More research is needed. One must
pay particular attention to the treatment decision at issue, since
that will almost certainly have a large effect on observed
incapacity levels.
This leaves variation number three: the symmetric sliding
scale. This version is appropriate. Plainly, complex decisions
require a greater level of understanding than simple ones, and
108
weighty decisions demand more appreciation than trivial ones.
Allowing the capacity standard to vary in these ways is just a
corollary of the principle that capacity is task-specific. Making
decisions
necessarily
involves
comparing
alternatives.
Understanding and appreciating both alternatives is required for
meaningful decision making. The asymmetric sliding scale
focuses on the perceived quality of one choice, the choice made,
which improperly interjects physician value judgments. In
contrast, the symmetric sliding scale considers the complexity
and stakes of the choices presented, not the choice made. The
focus is properly on the decision-making process, not the result.
2. Standardized Instruments
Capacity in close cases should be assessed through formal
standardized instruments, not through doctors' discretionary
judgments. The primary reason is simple: "informal assessments
performed by physicians are idiosyncratic and unreliable."' 0 9
One study reported a mere 56% agreement among unguided
physician assessments of capacity in Alzheimer's patients."0 A
follow-up study by the same researchers employing specified
legal standards and a standardized assessment tool found 76%
agreement.' 1 '
See discussion infra Parts III.C.1, 6.
On the distinction between understanding and appreciation, see Appelbaum
& Grisso, supra note 22.
109 Edward D. Sturman, The Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research: A
Review of Standardized Assessment Tools, 25 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 954, 954, 963
(2005).
110 Daniel C. Marson et al., Consistency of Physician Judgments of Capacity to
Consent in Mild Alzheimer's Disease,45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 453, 453 (1997).
111 Daniel C. Marson et al., Consistency of Physicians' Legal Standard and
PersonalJudgments of Competency in Patients with Alzheimer's Disease, 48 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 911, 911 (2000). Standardized instruments may not be needed
107

108
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Even worse, unguided physician judgments appear to be
systematically biased. "[I]ncapacity may be more frequently
112
diagnosed in treatment-refusers than in treatment-acceptors."
Comparisons of instrument-based and clinician ratings of
capacity find that a significant proportion of patients are judged
by physicians to have capacity but by instruments to lack
capacity. "Notably, this rating discrepancy occurs most often
with treatment-acceptors, implying a systematic rater bias with
important ethical ramifications." ' 13 This pattern probably
reflects use of the asymmetric sliding scale, which, as argued
above, is inappropriate. The data suggest that instrument-based
4
capacity assessment may help to overcome this bias.'
The downside of standardized instruments is time. The
leading assessment tool, the MacCAT-T, requires substantial
training and takes between fifteen and twenty minutes to
administer.'1 5 If, however, full-capacity testing were limited to
instances in which screening in relatively high incapacity baserate populations identifies problems, as proposed below, the
costs would be largely be mitigated. Of course, training costs
may still be substantial. Preliminary success with one screening
instrument led researchers to conclude that "screening every
patient for
clinical competency is possible and economically
,1 16
feasible.

Several factors are relevant in reaching this conclusion. The
costs of administration and training are key, but those costs can
be reduced not only by screening, but also by shifting
in the ICU, where high levels of agreement in essentially unguided clinical
judgments have been observed (89%). Lewis M. Cohen et al.,
Do Clinical and
Formal Assessments of the Capacity of Patients in the Intensive Care Unit to Make
DecisionsAgree?, 153 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2481, 2483 (1993).
112 Jennifer Moye et al., EmpiricalAdvances in the Assessment of the Capacity to
Consent to Medical Treatment: Clinical Implications and Research Needs, 26
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1054, 1064 (2006) (citation omitted).
113 Id. at 1069.
114 The leading standardized instruments measure abilities with respect to the
particular treatment decision at issue, which effectively (and appropriately)
incorporates the symmetric sliding scale.
115 Thomas Grisso et al., The MacCAT-T: A Clinical Tool to Assess Patients'

Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1415, 1416

(1997).
116 Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., The Hopkins Competency Assessment Test: A Brief
Method for Evaluating Patients' Capacity to Give Informed Consent, 43 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 132, 135 (1992).
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responsibility for testing away from doctors toward less costly
health-care professionals. A standardized instrument includes
many steps without discretionary judgment, where there is little
need for a doctor. Two primary benefits must be weighed
against these costs: an increase in the true positive rate and a
decrease in the false positive rate. The inter-rater reliability
numbers cited above are merely-but strongly-suggestive of
these benefits. Given the very low inter-rater reliability of
unguided discretionary judgment, it would appear that
standardized instruments could generate substantial, costjustified benefits.
C. When to Test for Capacity
There are many possible answers to this question: never,
always, before administering particular treatments, based on
patient status (e.g., all inpatients), for certain diagnoses or
symptoms, whenever the patient makes the "wrong" decision,
and based on a screening test. Illinois law requires capacity
testing for two treatments: psychotropic medication and ECT.
Does this requirement make sense? Should capacity testing be
And, if so, when?
required more narrowly or broadly?
Reviewing the other possibilities for capacity testing and existing
data on incapacity will help to answer these questions.
1. GeneralPropositions
Never testing the capacity of patients to give informed consent
would make the presumption of capacity irrebuttable. This
would be warranted if no one were in fact incapacitated, or if the
test for incapacity had no validity, or if the alternative decisionmaking process were no better than letting an incapacitated
patient decide. However, existing data strongly suggest that all
three of these propositions are false. Countless studies identify
individuals who lack capacity. Although the quest for validity is
plagued by the absence of a readily available gold standard, high
inter-rater reliability and comparison to expert judgment suggest
that standardized capacity-assessment tools tend to meaningfully
distinguish between those with and without capacity. Further,
surrogates do better than chance in predicting patient
preferences.
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Testing every patient would obviously be very costly. Again,
the leading assessment tool requires training and takes between
fifteen and twenty minutes to administer. 117 Setting cost to one
side, the base rate of incapacity among all patients is almost
certainly too low to justify testing everyone. Given reasonable
assumptions about test validity and surrogate accuracy, it is
possible to quantify this intuition.
Assume, consistent with the overriding objective of selfdetermination, that the goal of medical decision making is to
minimize instances in which treatment deviates from a patient's
true preference.
Patients with capacity express their true
preference one hundred percent of the time, whereas patients
without capacity do no better than chance, stating their true
preference 50% of the time. 18 (This assumes a binary choice,
even though there may be more than one treatment option.) A
capacity test can only distinguish between the two categories of
patients with error. Assume that x represents the probability
that the incapacity test correctly identifies incapacitated people
as such. Assume further that the false positive rate-the
probability of a positive incapacity test when the patient has
capacity-is z. If the patient tests positive for incapacity, the
treatment decision will be made by a surrogate under a pure
substituted judgment rule, with an accuracy rate of s. Let y be
the prevalence or base rate of incapacity in the patient
population.
The net effect of testing on treatment decisions is the number
of treatment errors introduced due to false positives minus
errors avoided due to true positives. When those two numbers
are equal, testing is equivalent to not testing in terms of
treatment errors. At a given level of surrogate accuracy, higher
test accuracy and higher base rates will reduce treatment errors.

Grisso et al., supra note 115, at 1416.
capacity must necessarily be reduced to a yes or no outcome, it
turns on continuous rather than dichotomous variables, so the assumptions of 100%
and 50% are somewhat arbitrary. The 100% figure can be defended as true by
definition: if a patient has capacity, then the preference they express is deemed to
be their actual preference. The 50% figure is more arbitrary. It could be the case
that some individuals without capacity make systematically bad (rather than
random) choices. It is also quite likely that some individuals just below the capacity
threshold express their actual preferences more often than chance would determine.
I take 50% as an admittedly arbitrary central tendency.
117

118 Although

20081

Illusory Consent

The following equation, an application of Bayes' Theorem,"'
shows the relationships among x, y, z, and s at the point of
indifference between testing and not testing:
EQUATION: THRESHOLD FOR CAPACITY TESTING

x* y

* (s -0.5) = "z
y)*(
[x* y + z * (I1-Y~

(I y) x *
-Y
X*

(Iy

In words, the left side of the equation is the probability of a
true positive multiplied by the improvement in decision making
from substituting the surrogate for a patient without capacity.
The right side is the false positive rate times the effect of shifting
from perfect decision making to a flawed surrogate. When the
effects of true positives and false positives are equal, testing and
not testing produce equal numbers of treatment errors. The
equation is therefore a formal representation of that indifference
point (curve, actually).
Recall that surrogate accuracy in a recent review of sixteen
studies was 68% overall, 79% for current health conditions, and
Plugging these figures
58% for scenarios involving dementia.
into the equation as s, making an additional assumption about
z,12 and graphing the relationship between x and y generates the
122
following figure. 1 , Testing would reduce errors in the region
above the line, but would increase errors below it.

119 Bayes' Theorem is a mathematical formula used to determine conditional
probabilities. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bayes' Theorem, http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
120 Shalowitz et al., supra note 62, at 493, 495.
121 1 assume that z is equal to I - x. This is equivalent to assuming that sensitivity
(1 - false negative rate) equals specificity (1 - false positive rate), which is not
necessarily true. The effect of relaxing this assumption will be explored below, infra
note 126.
122 With known values for s and z reduced to a function of x, only x and y remain
in the equation, so creating the graph is simply a matter of inserting values between
0 and 1 for x and solving for y, once for each value of s.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 353

FIGURE: BASE RATE INCAPACITY JUSTIFYING CAPACITY
TESTING GIVEN ACCURACY OF TEST

0.9
TEST
0.8

:

0.7

E .

-..
Surrogate
-

0.5

Accuracy
=68-

Surrogate Accuracy = 79%
SurrogateAccuracy 58%

D07NOTTEST
99 0.2
0.1

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

TestAccuracy (X)

The figure is useful in evaluating the proposition that every
patient should be tested for capacity. This Article's author is not
aware of any study measuring the validity of standardized
capacity-assessment tools in predicting judicial or quasi-judicial
determinations after hearings.
Whether or not such
determinations are truly more accurate in gauging capacity,
these rulings are given the force of law and thus become the
"gold standard" by convention. In the absence of such direct
validity measures, one might suppose that reliability estimateshow often the judgments of two independent testers agree-are
in the same ballpark as validity. A very recent reliability
estimate for judgments based on the MacCAT-T was
approximately 0.88. 23 At this high level of test accuracy and the
highest of the three surrogate-accuracy levels, the base rate of
incapacity would need to be 9% or higher to justify across-theboard capacity testing. In fact, the levels of incapacity observed

123 Vanessa Raymont et al., The Inter-Rater Reliability of Mental Capacity
Assessments, 30 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 112, 114 (2007).

This paper reports

kappa (k = 0.76), not percentage agreement. I estimated percentage agreement
using the formula for kappa. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohen%27s-kappa
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
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among control groups range from 0% to 18%,
and are
generally less than 9%. Thus, even if testing were costless and
one makes assumptions that favor testing, it would probably not
make sense to test every patient.
Should we test subsets of patients selected by treatment,
status, diagnosis, symptom, decision, or screening? Given the
same pro-testing assumptions, the answer is yes whenever the
base rate of incapacity is 9% or greater. However, a great deal
turns on the assumptions. Suppose capacity-test accuracy were
0.78 or 0.68 instead of 0.88 or that surrogate accuracy were at
one of the lower two levels. Reliability numbers in fact go as low
as 0.76125 and the 68% surrogate accuracy figure is based on the
largest sample. Using these values instead would put the base
rate incapacity cut-off at 36%. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to
suppose that the cut-off base rate for testing (at least for
nondementia patients) should be somewhere between 9% and
36%.126 Having laid the groundwork for deciding when to assess
capacity, this Article will now consider the various criteria one
might use as triggers for testing.
2. Treatment
Existing data provide some support for Illinois's requirement
of capacity testing before administering ECT. One study found
26% of ECT patients as incompetent or probably incompetent
to consent to ECT.12 7 The data more strongly support testing
before voluntary admission. In one study, "half of the newly
[voluntarily] admitted patients did not think they needed
hospitalization for treatment.' 28 In another, only one patient
124 Dilip V. Jeste et al., Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in
People with Schizophrenia Compared to Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 121,126 (2005).
125 Marson et al., supra note 111, at 911.

126 As explained above, this range assumes that sensitivity equals specificity.
Taking a sensitivity rate in the mid-range of reliability estimates, 0.83, and the
middle figure, 68%, gives an estimate of the effect of allowing specificity to vary.
At a 10% false positive rate, the base rate incapacity threshold for testing is 18%.

At 17% (1 - x), the threshold is 27%. And at 24%, the cut-off is 34%.
127 Loren H. Roth et al., Competency to Decide About Treatment or Research: An
Overview of Some Empirical Data, 5 INT'L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 29, 40 (1982) (finding
"[s]ix of 23 ECT patients" to be "either incompetent or probably incompetent").
128 Paul S. Appelbaum et al., EmpiricalAssessment of Competency to Consent to
PsychiatricHospitalization,138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170, 1174 (1981).
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out of forty was able to recall in a subsequent interview any part
of the voluntary-admission form he or she had signed.129 Half of

the interviews took place as early as between one and three days
after admission. 30 A third study found that 30% of voluntarily
admitted patients lacked capacity to consent to admission. 3'

The case for across-the-board testing before administering
psychotropic medication is less compelling. Among newly
admitted psychiatric inpatients, the base rate of incapacity to
consent to antipsychotic medication (46%) appears to be well
above the threshold that would justify across-the-board
testing. 32 The same is true for elderly hospital inpatients (50%
incapacity). 33 It is doubtful that such high rates of incapacity
exist among outpatients. The relatively low rates reported below
for psychiatric outpatients are suggestive. Second-generation
antipsychotic medications are prescribed not only to address
acute psychosis, but also to maintain relatively normal
functioning among schizophrenic and bipolar individuals.
Furthermore, psychotropic medication under Illinois statute
includes not only antipsychotics but also antidepressants. Many
millions of Americans take antidepressants,

and data suggest

129 Albert B. Palmer & Julian Wohl Voluntary-Admission Forms: Does the
Patient Know What He's Signing?, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 250, 252
(1972).
130 Id. at 251.

131 See Michael A. Norko et al., A Clinical Study of Competency to Consent to
Voluntary Psychiatric Hospitalization, 11 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3, 11

(1990). A fourth study found that 44% of voluntarily admitted patients were
incompetent to consent to treatment within the hospital. B.F. Hoffman & J.
Srinivasan, A Study of Competence to Consent to Treatment in a Psychiatric
Hospital, 37 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 179, 181 (1992).
132 See James C. Beck, Determining Competency to Assent to Neuroleptic Drug
Treatment, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1106, 1107 (1988) (finding that
in a sample of fifty-six hospital patients admitted consecutively to psychiatric unit,
all agreed to take antipsychotic medication but 46% remained incompetent to
consent throughout the forty-eight-hour period from the initial interview, even after
receiving a prepared explanation).
133 See Gurian et al., supra note 11, at 39 (50% of patients taking neuroleptics in
hospital had "neither insight into their disorder nor the capacity to fully
comprehend the risks and benefits of medication").
134 Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, "Almost Half of Americans Use at Least One
Prescription Drug: Annual Report on Nation's Health Shows," at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/04news/hus04.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009)
("Adult use of antidepressants almost tripled between 1988-1994 and 1999-2000.
Ten percent of women 18 and older and 4 percent of men now take
antidepressants.").
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that very
depressed outpatients lack decision-making
S135 few

capacity.
3. Status
This discussion of psychotropic medication suggests that,

when considering incapacity rates, it may be important to
distinguish among treatment settings such as a hospital, an ICU,
a nursing home, or an outpatient facility, for example. Among
schizophrenics, the incapacity rate varies from as high as 52%
for inpatients136 to 10% for outpatients.137 Hospitalized elderly
patients with medical problems have lower capacity (28%

incapacity)
than comparable individuals in the community (4%
•
.. \138
incapacity).
Nursing-home residents do very poorly on
39
capacity tests.1
One study "reported that the majority of
nursing home residents had intermediate to profound
impairments in capacity.' ' 4 0 Another study found that 34% to
38% of newly admitted ICU patients lacked capacity.14' A

review summarized decisional impairment among ICU patients
ranging from 44% to 69%.42
4. Diagnosis
The two diagnostic groups most widely tested for capacity are
individuals with schizophrenia and dementia. As noted above,
135 See Sturman, supra note 109, at 970 (summarizing study finding no incapacity
among outpatients with depression and 24%-25% incapacity among inpatients).
136 Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 171.
137 J.G. Wong et al., The Capacity of People with a "Mental Disability" to Make a
Health Care Decision, 30 PSYCHOL. MED. 295, 302 tbl.2 (2000) (finding 90% of
patients to have capacity). This 10% figure was not significantly higher than the 0%
rate observed in a control group. Id. at 295.
138 L. Jaime Fitten & Martha S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitalization on
Treatment Decision-Making Capacity in the Elderly, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL

MED. 1717, 1719 tbl. 2 (1990) (finding 28% incapacity among age 60+ inpatients
with acute but not critical illness and 4% among control group).
139 L. Jaime Fitten et al., Assessing Treatment Decision-Making Capacity in
Elderly Nursing Home Residents, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 1097, 1097 (1990)
("Of 51 Veterans Affairs nursing home residents... only 33.3% demonstrated
intact decision-making capacity ...").
140 Sturman, supranote 109, at 968.
141 Cohen et al., supra note 111, at 2483 (finding that nurses and physicians would
request informed consent from 66% and 62% of patients, respectively, indicating
that 34% to 38% lacked capacity to consent).
142 Kim et al., supra note 59, at 159.
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estimated incapacity rates among schizophrenics
range from
• ,• 143
52% for inpatients to 10% for outpatients. Rates of incapacity
among patients with dementia is quite high, with severity of
illness playing an important role. One study employing several
standardized instruments found 9%-23% of adults with mild
dementia to be impaired in understanding.' 44 Another study
reported that on the most demanding legal standing
(understanding choice), 93% of those with mild Alzheimer's
disease (AD) (MMSE > 19) and 100% of those with moderate
AD (10 _ MMSE < 20) were incompetent. 14 5 A low-risk
research study applying a very low threshold of capacity
excluded 76% of severely demented subjects. 46 One reviewer

concluded that "persons with MMSE scores in the mild to early
moderate stage of dementia (MMSE 19 to 23) warrant
a detailed
47
assessment of their decision-making abilities.',
5. Symptom
Symptoms may be more important than diagnosis. Among
individuals suffering from acute psychosis-schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar mood disorder-diagnosis
has been found not to correlate with capacity: "the presence of
cognitively related symptoms [e.g., delusions, grandiosity, and
unusual thought], such as thought disorder rather than diagnosis,
may better identify the subgroup of patients who require
particular support with consent procedures.' 48 Other symptoms
that have been shown to be negatively correlated with capacity
include: (1) lack of judgment and insight, difficulty in abstract

143

See supra notes 136-37.

144

Moye et al., supra note 112, at 1062.
Daniel C. Marson et al., Assessing the Competency of Patients with

145

Alzheimer's Disease Under Different Legal Standards: A Prototype Instrument, 52
ARCH. NEUROL. 949, 952 tbl.3 (1995).
146 B. Geiselmann, Demented Subjects' Competence to Consent to Participatein
Field Studies: The Berlin Ageing Study, 13 MED. & L. 177, 182 (1994).
147 J.H.T. Karlawish et al., The Ability of Persons with Alzheimer Disease (AD) to
Make a Decision About Taking an AD Treatment, 64 NEUROLOGY 1514, 1518
(2005).
148 V. Howe et al., Competence to Give Informed Consent in Acute Psychosis Is
Associated with Symptoms Rather than Diagnosis, 77 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 211,
214 (2005).
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1 49
thinking, conceptual disorganization, and cognitive deficits;
and (2) cognitive dysfunction, avolition,
apathy, anhedonia,
• • 150
inappropriate affect, and hallucinations.

One study concludes that,
[a] more effective approach [to assessing capacity among
psychiatric patients] than focusing on diagnosis is to be
attentive to cognitive deficits and negative symptoms. Use of
brief screening questionnaires may also be an efficient means
of identifying who would benefit from more extensive capacity
evaluations and/or enhanced consent procedures.15
Screening is discussed below.
Delirium is another symptom that would appear to justify
capacity testing. In one earlier mentioned study of older
inpatients with delirium, researchers found a "relatively high
baseline rate of functional impairment (76%) . . . and notable
cognitive impairment (mean MMSE of 20.1). "152
6. Decision
As noted above in the sliding-scale discussion, it has been
observed that "patients who refuse treatment tend to have less
capacity than those who accept it."' 153 Depending on the levels of
incapacity observed among refusers and acceptors of treatment,
this difference might justify capacity testing of treatment refusers
only. More research is needed. Note that such an asymmetric
sliding screen could be justified by straightforward application of
the general formula set forth above, without any balancing
between autonomy and beneficence or any thumb on the
treatment side of the scale.
149 See Josephine G.W.S. Wong et al., Decision-Making Capacity of Inpatients
with Schizophrenia in Hong Kong, 193 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 316

(2005); Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 169.
150 David J. Moser et al., Capacity to Provide Informed Consent for Participation
in Schizophrenia and HIV Research, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1201, 1204-06 (2002);

Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 173.
151 Barton W. Palmer & Dilip V. Jeste, Relationship of Individual Cognitive
Abilities to Specific Components of Decisional Capacity Among Middle-Aged and
Older Patients with Schizophrenia, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 98, 105 (2005)
(citation omitted).
152 Auerswald, supra note 12, at 413.
153

Francine Cournos, Do Psychiatric Patients Need Greater Protection than

Medical Patients When They Consent to Treatment?, 64 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 319, 327
(1993).
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7. Screening
The costs of capacity testing could be reduced substantially
with reasonably accurate screening mechanisms. One recent
study is instructive. 5 4 The study assessed the capacity to consent
to participate in a research project of almost even numbers of
subjects with schizophrenia, mild to moderate AD, and diabetes.
Researchers administered both the MacCAT-CR (the research
version of the MacCAT-T) and a three-item questionnaire to all
101 subjects. The three questions were: "(1) 'What is the
purpose of the study?' (2) 'What are the risks?' and (3) 'What
are the benefits?" ' 155 (These questions could easily be transposed
to the treatment context.) "All 13 of the patients impaired on
the MacCAT-CR
understanding subscale had 3-item,
questionnaire total scores of 2.5 or "less,
and specificity (1 - false
/"0/,,156
positives) at this cut score was 77.3%o.
In other words, 36%
of those who failed the three-item test were deemed
incapacitated. Note that this base rate justifies capacity testing,
even given relatively anti-testing assumptions. Screening tests
have the potential to identify with little cost a subset of
individuals from a relatively low-risk population (13% in the
study) who are at a high enough risk of incapacity (36%) to
justify thorough testing.'57 In other words, a 13% incapacity base
rate could be taken as the threshold for mandatory capacity
screening.
8. Implications
Even on assumptions that disfavor testing, the goal of
minimizing deviations from true treatment preferences would
justify full-capacity testing in groups with base-rate incapacity at
or above 36% and capacity screening in groups with base rates at
or above 13%. With the exceptions of normal control groups,
154 Barton W. Palmer et al., Assessment of Capacity to Consent to Research
Among Older Persons with Schizophrenia,Alzheimer Disease, or Diabetes Mellitus,
62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 726 (2005).
155 Id. at 728.
156 Id. at 731.
157 Note that this threshold for screening is substantially below the level
suggested by some commentators. See Saks & Jeste, supra note 7, at 411, 426
("[E]ven if only most mentally ill people were incompetent, it might make sense at
least to inquire-do some kind of screening-of people with serious mental illness

.... ") (emphasis added).
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outpatient schizophrenics, outpatients on antidepressants, and
perhaps the mildly demented, testing or screening would seem
justified for most of the groups (by treatment, diagnosis,
symptom, etc.) discussed above. One could simply mandate
capacity testing or screening before treatment for anyone in one
of these groups. There are several reasons, however, to pause
before doing so.
First, testing and screening take time. The three-item
questionnaire described above would seem relatively quick, but
to be meaningful it must be followed by full-capacity testing in
the third or more of subjects who fail. As many as two-thirds of
those tested, or one-quarter of the total screened, will have
capacity. To be sure, the screening questionnaire could
eliminate the need for testing in as many as two-thirds of the
population, but the costs of follow-up testing would still be
substantial. The opportunity costs of doctor and patient time are
difficult to estimate and perhaps infeasible to trade off against
erroneous treatment decisions. However, quite substantial costs
of screening and testing would be justified in order to bring
treatment decisions more in line with patients' true preferences.
Treatment without bona fide consent is illegitimate and should
be avoided even at high cost.
Second, different treatment decisions require different levels
of capacity. A moderately demented man may understand the
situation well enough to consent to take aspirin for a headache,
but might be completely stymied by more complicated
treatment. The numbers reported above are specific to
particular treatment decisions, and these decisions may not be
typical or representative of those faced by actual patients. This
problem may be mitigated to some extent where multiple studies
addressing different treatment decisions reveal comparable
estimates of base-rate incapacity. And while screening and
testing for simple decisions may not be error-rate justified in
every case, at least it will take less time than for more complex
decisions.
Third, differential capacity assessment by diagnosis is
arguably discriminatory.
However, the existence of data
showing the discriminatory practice advances the goal of
bringing treatment into line with true patient preferences should
overcome due process, equal protection, and Americans with
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Disabilities Act ("ADA") challenges.' 58 The159disparate impact of
the practice would seem similarly justifiable.
9. Proposal

Documented capacity screening-and, if warranted by
screening, full testing-should be required before medical
treatment whenever there is good reason to believe that the

patient may lack capacity to consent to treatment. 160 A statute
adopting this proposal could provide a nonexhaustive list of
6 a

"good reasons" based on existing data.

161

On the list would be:

(1) the patient is seeking voluntary admission to a psychiatric
unit or facility; 162 (2) the patient is in an inpatient facility and the
treatment is psychotropic medication; 63 (3) the treatment is
ECT; (4) the patient is in the ICU; (5) the patient is in a nursing
home; (6) the patient is suffering from acute psychosis, cognitive
deficits, negative symptoms (listed above), or delirium;164 and (7)
the patient has an MMSE score less than twenty-four. Note that
to minimize discrimination, the proposed statute omits any
reference to diagnosis. In any tort or civil rights action based on

158 The ADA prohibits: "Providing . . . different . . . services to people with
disabilities, unless . . . different benefits are necessary to provide qualified
individuals ... services that are as effective as those provided to others." ROBERT
M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES 167 (1996) (emphasis added).
159 RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 1132 (3d ed. 1999) (ADA prohibits disparate impact).
160 Others have made similar recommendations. See Edward Etchells et al.,
Bioethics for Clinicians:3. Capacity, 155 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 657, 658 (1996) ("If it
is unreasonable to presume capacity, then a capacity assessment should be
undertaken.").
161 Better data could support a statute or practice guidelines that would
simultaneously account for different variables. Such statistical prediction models
have proven very useful in other contexts. See generally IAN AYRES, SUPER
CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO. BE SMART

(2007).
162 1 am not the first to make the recommendation. See Cournos et al., supranote
52, at 299. The task force, however, would have set a much lower capacity
threshold.
163 One researcher has gone further in this context, proposing that there should
be a presumption of incompetence. Gurian et al., supra note 11, at 43.
164 Here, the supporting evidence is correlational within diagnosis rather than
measuring absolute levels by symptom across diagnoses. Additional research is
needed. See Laura B. Dunn, Capacity to Consent to Research in Schizophrenia: The
Expanding Evidence Base, 24 BEHAV. SCI. L. 431, 434 (2006).
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unauthorized treatment, no treating physician, other health
professional, or facility could rely on the presumption of capacity
if the physician, professional, or any employee of the facility
knew or should have known there was good reason to believe
that the patient may have lacked capacity to consent to
treatment and the physician, professional, or employee did not
screen or test for capacity.
This last provision should hopefully' go some distance in
solving the problem that mandatory capacity-assessment statutes
are basically ignored.
Other more direct enforcement
mechanisms are possible. The failure to screen or test where
required could give rise to a private cause of action for a set
statutory amount. However, the amount reasonably at issue
seems unlikely to justify many lawsuits.
Administrative
procedures may make more sense. The state health authority
(or Joint Commission on hospital accreditation) could perform
periodic unannounced inspections of medical records and fine
health-care providers for failing to document capacity testing
165
As others have suggested for informed
where required.
consent generally, funds raised through fines could be used to
compensate individuals who were harmed by failures to assess
capacity.' 66
10. Counter-Arguments and Responses
Bruce Winick has argued that capacity testing should not be
required before an individual voluntarily admits himself to a
mental hospital. 67 Winick provides five arguments, which could
apply to mandatory capacity screening and testing outside the
voluntary-admission context: (1) "requiring such an inquiry for
all mental patients seeking hospital admission . . . seems to
165 Failures to attempt to consult with surrogates where capacity is lacking should
be penalized in the same way. See C. Dennis Barton, Jr., et al., Clinicians'Judgment
of Capacity of Nursing Home Patients to Give Informed Consent, 47 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 956, 956 (1996) ("None of the [13] subjects whom clinical staff identified
as clinically incompetent was provided with surrogate decision makers in
accordance with procedures outlined in state law.").
166 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 61,152 n.3 (quoting Leonard

L. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 606-07

(1975)).
167 See Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and
Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137 (1996) [hereinafter

Winick, MacArthur].
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accept the 19th-century assumption that mental illness per se
destroys decision-making capacity"; 16 8 (2) once one starts
questioning capacity, there is no logical stopping point and this
"would necessitate an inquiry into the issue of competence every
time an individual with mental illness seeks to exercise a
right"; 169 (3) incompetency labeling "imposes serious adverse
social consequences and psychological damage"; 170 (4) because
competency "often is a close question," the presumption of
competence prevents "excessive paternalism";17 ' and, finally, (5)
better adherence to the presumption of competence will
"produce competency adjudications that are considerably more
accurate and more protective of individual autonomy than under
present practices. 17 2 None of these arguments should prevail.
First, as demonstrated above, combining certain plausible
assumptions with actual incapacity data shows that across-theboard screening and testing of individuals seeking voluntary
admission can be expected to reduce instances in which decisions
deviate from the individuals' true preferences. That all such
individuals lack capacity was not one of the premises for this
showing. Rather, the showing was based on several estimates of
actual incapacity and surrogate accuracy. But one need not look
at the numbers to see the flaw in Winick's position-indeed, he
concedes it by using the.wiggle words "seems to accept." There
would be no need for any inquiry into decision-making capacity
if one truly accepted the nineteenth-century assumption that the
mentally ill uniformly lack capacity. Requiring an inquiry
assumes just the opposite: that some mentally ill individuals have
capacity.
The second argument, a parade of horribles, is also a
nonstarter.173
Requiring capacity testing before medical
treatment says nothing about other contexts. Indeed, there are
very good reasons to treat medical care differently. Medical care
168

Id. at 154.

169

Id.

Id. (citing, inter alia, Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency
Labeling and the Implicationsfor Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
6 (1995) [hereinafter Winick, Side Effects]).
171 Winick, MacArthur, supra note 167, at 156-57.
172 Id. at 158.
173 That has not stopped others from ascribing to it. See Cournos et al., supra
note 52, at 297.
170
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without competent consent is battery, which carries civil and
possible criminal sanctions. Entering into a contract or making a
will without capacity may raise other issues, but certainly does
not constitute a tort or crime as serious as battery. Doctors are
trained to test capacity, or at least to understand the basics of
informed consent, and are available testers every time medical
care takes place. No comparable expert is already on the scene
in other contexts.
Third, Winick is no doubt correct that being labeled
incompetent has adverse consequences. But forgoing capacity
testing on this ground is a bit like taking your malfunctioning car
to a mechanic and, for fear of bad news, telling the mechanic not
to look under the hood. Being labeled incompetent is bad; being
incompetent is worse. To be incompetent is to lose control over
the most basic aspects of your life. Adding a label does not
change that. 74 Relatives do better than doctors in figuring out

what incapacitated patients would want. In order to shift
decision-making responsibility, however, there must be a
determination that the patient lacks capacity and that such a
determination may carry negative consequences. Using the
narrower term "incapacitated" rather than the more pejorative
"incompetent" may go some distance toward reducing stigma, 75
but ultimately the question is whether patients would prefer
more accurate decision making by family even though the cost
may be an incapacity label.
The benefits of more accurate decisions made by family
members outweigh the harms of incapacity labeling. One of
Winick's objections to incompetency labeling is that "surrogate
decision makers will likely be impersonal state officials or
employees whose paternalism is not based on love and is rarely
nurturing.",176 But this is not so when, as under my proposal, the
surrogate is a patient-appointed proxy, court-appointed
guardian, or, more likely, statutorily appointed close relative.
Indeed, it is the status quo-unconstrained decision making by
174 Cf Winick, Side Effects, supra note 170, at 13 ("Application of an
incompetency label usually produces an actual and obvious loss of control.").
175 Id. at 40.
176 Id. at 14; see also id. at 30 ("[P]aternalism on the basis of parental love and a
knowledge of the child's interest rooted in actual familiarity is much more likely to
be beneficial than that engaged in by impersonal state actors who lack an ongoing
relationship with the individual.").

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 353

the treating physician-that will often place a stranger at the
wheel).
Winick's fourth and fifth arguments are directed toward the
presumption of competence, not testing per se, but they could be
read broadly as attacks on mandatory testing. On the fourth
178
point, competency may not be so often a "close question.'
The observed high inter-rater reliability of standardized
capacity-assessment instruments suggests that judgment calls are
rather infrequent; capacity testers tend to agree. 7 9 In any event,
a mandatory-testing regime can leave room for the presumption
of capacity in close cases. This Article proposes that the
presumption be suspended only when no screening or testing
took place. Ultimately, whether "paternalism" is "excessive," or
whether a tie-breaker presumption of capacity increases or
reduces accuracy, depends on where one sets the capacity bar.
Apart from discussion of the sliding scale, this Article does not
address that question.
Winick's final argument is that presuming competency
protects individual autonomy. As long as the capacity bar is set
at the right level, the presumption protects only the illusion of
autonomy by ascribing capacity to some who lack it. A truly
incapacitated patient has no genuine autonomy. That such a
patient agrees to treatment is a happy accident, not an
expression of will.
D. Application and Implementation of the Model
Recall again the three hypotheticals set forth at the outset: (1)
a married woman with delirium, (2) a widow with dementia and
evening delusions, and (3) an unmarried bipolar man in a manic
state. In light of the patients' symptoms and the proposed
treatment, the first step in each case, assuming no emergency,
would be capacity screening followed by full testing if necessary.
Any patient who had capacity should of course be allowed to
make his or her own treatment decision. If any patient lacks
177 Winick also observes that the negative consequences of incompetency labeling
are increased when there is a formal hearing and "official finding of incompetency
by a judicial or administrative decision maker." Id. at 28. Thus, a clinical finding by
a health-care professional, as contemplated here, has fewer negative effects.
178 Winick, MacArthur, supra note 167, at 157.
179 See Raymont et al., supra note 123, at 114.
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capacity, the next step would be to look for an advance directive,
health-care proxy, or court-appointed guardian. Assuming none
exists, the health-care decision would be made by a statutory
surrogate, if available, which would be the husband in the first
hypothetical, the only adult child in the second hypothetical,
and, most likely, the man's parents in the third hypothetical. A
patient could insist on a second opinion regarding capacity if the
surrogate refuses treatment.
The surrogate's decision for
treatment or non-treatment otherwise would be final unless the
doctor obtains a court order overruling the decision as clearly
inconsistent with the patient's expressed preferences or best
interests. If the parents in the third hypothetical consented to
voluntary admission, the bipolar man would have a right to a
second opinion within twenty-four hours of such a request.
To make the proposal concrete in one state, Illinois would
need to enact the following six changes. First, a new section to
the Act should mandate capacity screening and testing where
there is good reason to doubt capacity, including a
nonexhaustive list of good reasons. Second, the Act should state
that screening and testing are to be done by standardized
instruments wherever feasible and expressly prohibit application
of the asymmetric sliding scale. Third, the Act should be
amended to state that an incapacitated patient's assent to
treatment when the surrogate refuses treatment does not qualify
as an "objection" so as to nullify applicability of the Act, but that
the patient can request a second opinion as to capacity. Fourth,
a section providing for judicial override of surrogate decisions on
the treating physician's petition should be added to the Act.
Fifth, the mental-health exceptions to the Act and related
limitations in the Code should be repealed insofar as they
include instances of patient assent. Finally, a twenty-four hour
second-opinion option should be added to the voluntaryadmission section of the Code.
IV
EXTENSIONS

A. When There Is No Surrogate
This Article has assumed that a statutory surrogate will be
available to make decisions when the patient is incapacitated.
Of course, this assumption will sometimes be false. A patient
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may have no willing and available surrogate. One solution in
such a case is to revert to effectively unconstrained physician
decision making.S That
solution has been suggested by at least
180
one commentator.
The justification to prefer surrogate
decision making set forth in this Article is that surrogates predict
patient preferences more accurately than doctors. When there is
no surrogate, there is no readily available decision maker with
proven increased accuracy. The treating physician is at least
available.
There are, however, other reasons to resist unrestrained
physician control.
Medical treatment without meaningful
consent is battery."" It is not meaningful for a doctor to
"consent" to her own treatment decisions. Where else can we
turn for consent? The existing statutory fall-back option is
guardianship. But guardianship is a time-consuming process,
and it may be infeasible to appoint a guardian before treating
every incapacitated patient, especially when the patient is
assenting to treatment. This problem is exacerbated in the
outpatient setting, where much treatment of dementia takes
place. It may make sense to create a more expedited process to
obtain interim consent while the guardianship process is
pursued. An ethics review board or, probably better, an
independent patient-advocate could be made available for
consultation and provisional decision making.
B. When the PatientRefuses Treatment

Approximately ten percent of psychiatric patients refuse
treatment.182 When the patient is incapacitated, there is some
surface appeal in treating assent and refusal the same. What
does it matter what the patient says if the patient lacks capacity?
The implication of accepting this position, in light of this
180 See Cournos, supra note 153, at 326 ("When a patient accepts treatment, the
agreement of the treating physician, and, when available, the family, constitutes a
check on the reasonableness of the patient's decision.") (emphasis added).
181Some states have carved out exceptions. See Grant H. Morris, Judging
Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental Patientsto Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 343, 380 (1995) (Under California statute, "[n]onprotesting
[involuntarily committed mental] patients may be treated with psychotropic
medication without giving a competent consent.").
182 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic
Medications: Retrospect and Prospect,145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 418 (1988).
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Article's thesis with respect to assent, would be to shift decisionmaking authority to a surrogate. The surrogate would have
authority to overrule treatment refusal in the same way the
surrogate would have authority to overrule treatment assent.
That position should be rejected. Treatment assent and refusal
are not parallel in important respects.
183
Patients have a general right to refuse treatment, but have a
right to treatment only in limited circumstances (e.g., when the
state is custodian). 1 ' Overruling treatment refusal more directly
implicates privacy and due process interests and may therefore
require a more formal adjudication of capacity and
appropriateness of treatment. Overriding a refusal also requires
deception, coercion, or force. It makes sense to more carefully
constrain exercise of such disfavored methods.'8 5 And, finally,
treatment over refusal is often less effective than treatment with
assent.186 One might expect doctors and surrogates to appreciate
and factor in this last point, but the other two distinct aspects of
overriding refusal-patient rights and coercive methodsrequire special protection.
One alternative would be to combine the second-opinion and
independent-patient-advocate proposals outlined at different
points above. Specifically, physicians and surrogates seeking to
override patient refusal would need to obtain a second medical
opinion finding both incapacity and treatment appropriateness,
as well as consent from an independent patient advocate who
would discuss the issues with the physician, surrogate, and, to the
extent possible, the patient. Repeating capacity testing can

183 See Rebecca J. O'Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in

Illinois-Answersto the Legal Questions that Health Care ProvidersFace on a Daily
Basis, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 460-61 (1998) ("As the Illinois Appellate Court

stated, '[t]he right to refuse medical treatment has been recognized under
constitutional right-to-privacy principles and is deeply ingrained in common law
principles of individual autonomy, self-determination, and informed consent."')
(alteration original) (citing Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 889
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3(a) (2008); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
40/5 (2008).
184 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY, §§ 2.02-2.07 (1994).

185 On the clinical costs of coercion, see APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 86,
at 204.
186 Winick, Competency to Consent, supranote 1, at 198, 213.
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substantially increase confidence in an incapacity finding, and
the additional pro-treatment assessments by a second medical
professional and a patient advocate would provide some
assurance that treatment is appropriate. As with patient assent,
surrogates would have the power, subject to court overrule, to
veto treatment. The following table summarizes the tentative
proposal:
TABLE: SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES BY ASSENT/CONSENT
TO TREATMENT

Surrogate Consent

Surrogate Refusal

Patient
Assent

Treatment

No treatment, subject to
second opinion at request
of patient or judicial
override at request of
doctor

Patient
Refusal

Treatment, if second opinion
confirms incapacity and
treatment appropriateness
and independent patient
advocate consents

No treatment, subject to
judicial override at
request of doctor

This proposal can be criticized as both over- and underprotective of patient rights. Requiring a second opinion would
often be cumbersome in the outpatient setting. On the other
hand, providing less than notice and a hearing arguably falls
short of constitutional requirements.
Whether the more
informal process proposed here is constitutional is outside the
scope of this Article. It is important to note, however, that a
more formal process does not necessarily translate into greater
protection of patient interests. Doctors will develop strategies to
avoid costly and time-consuming court hearings.
These
strategies may include: (1) discharging, failing to admit, or
otherwise not treating patients who refuse treatment; (2)
selectively disclosing information to ensure assent; (3) coercing
187 At 76% test accuracy with a 24% false positive rate and 36% incapacity base
rate, a single positive incapacity test is 64% likely to show true incapacity. Testing
twice increases confidence to 85%.
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"voluntary" treatment; (4) and treating nonemergency situations
as emergencies to avoid the consent requirement. 88 Less costly
procedures, like repeat capacity testing, may hold more potential
in promoting patient autonomy and well-being.
CONCLUSION

An incapacitated patient cannot meaningfully consent to
medical care. And yet, current legal rules and the beneficence
imperative of doctoring provide strong incentives to take such
illusory consent at face value. Two such legal rules are the
presumption of capacity and, in the mental-health setting, the
requirement for court proceedings. The beneficence principle
means that doctors generally place patient well-being above
other values, including self-determination.
Together, these
incentives in fact dominate actual practice. Doctors tend to
question capacity only when the patient refuses treatment. If the
patient assents to treatment, it is often given with no inquiry into
patient capacity. This practice of respecting illusory consent
superficially advances the goal of patient autonomy. "The
patient said yes, so we're just respecting that decision." A
subtler version of this argument is that even an incapacitated
individual has some residual autonomy, so, at least when the
patient is making a good decision, we should respect that
autonomy.' 89 But autonomy means respecting bad decisions as
well as good ones. The best way to advance the goal of selfdetermination is to make the treatment decisions that the patient
would have made if the patient had capacity. The question
should be which decision maker will best accomplish this end.
The patient, by definition, is incapacitated, which leaves, in
most cases and short of going to court, the doctor and the family
as decision makers. The current system in Illinois and many
other states effectively assigns treatment decisions, if the patient
assents, to doctors. Relatives do better than both chance and
doctors in predicting patient preferences. Because the patient's
wishes should remain the gold standard even if the patient loses
the ability to make decisions for himself, relatives rather than
188 E.g., Morris, supra note 181, at 385-86; Delila M.J. Ledwith, Jones v.
Gerhardstein: The Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment with PsychotropicDrugs, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1367, 1391 (1990).
189 Winick, Competency to Consent,supra note 1, at 192-93.
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doctors should be in charge. Consulting relatives is obviously
much less burdensome than going to court, but experience
outside the mental-health context demonstrates that reducing
this cost of capacity testing may not be sufficient to induce
doctors to assess capacity more routinely.
If the goal is to minimize deviations from actual patient
preferences, and costs of testing are set aside, three variables
determine whether capacity testing should take place: (1) the
accuracy of the test, (2) the base rate of incapacity in the
population tested, and (3) the accuracy of surrogates. There are
substantial data on each of these three variables, which together
suggest several types of patients and treatment decisions where
capacity assessment should be mandatory. These mandates
could be enforced through a system of administrative monitoring
and penalties.
Respect for individual autonomy sometimes requires
overriding what the individual says. This may be true when a
patient lacks decision-making capacity, even if the patient agrees
to beneficial treatment. The same patient might not have agreed
to treatment if he had capacity to give informed consent.
Doctors in this situation will be very unlikely to allow the goal of
patient well-being to be trumped by the goal of patient selfdetermination. Family may also be imperfect, but the data
suggest that they will do better at honoring a patient's true
treatment preferences.
The goal of self-determination
sometimes requires that capacity be tested and, where incapacity
is found, decisions delegated to family.

